US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
7-1-2015

The Limits of Military Officers’ Duty to Obey Civilian Orders: A
Neo-Classical Perspective
Robert E. Atkinson, Mr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Atkinson,, Robert E. Mr., "The Limits of Military Officers’ Duty to Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical
Perspective" (2015). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 448.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/448

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP and
DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
contributes to the education of world class senior
leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides
solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.

U.S. Army War College

SLDR

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic
studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
i

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

THE LIMITS OF MILITARY OFFICERS’ DUTY
TO OBEY CIVILIAN ORDERS:
A NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

Robert E. Atkinson, Jr.
July 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

iii

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

iv

*****
The author very much appreciates the comments and encouragement received from faculty members at the Army, Navy,
and Air Force Academies and the Army and Navy War Colleges
who are, quite literally, too numerous to name in the usual space.
Many of them referred me to Dr. Don Snider, indisputably the
dean of military professionalism studies. I can fairly say that,
without his help, you would not be reading this. Nor would any
of you be reading nearly so neatly annotated a version without
the exceptional research assistance of Alexandra Akre, Florida
State University (FSU) Law 2016, and Christopher Roberts, FSU
Law 2015.

ISBN 1-58487-696-4

v

FOREWORD
This monograph offers a neo-classically republican
perspective on a perennial problem of civilian/military
relations: limitations on military officers’ obligation to
obey civilian authorities. All commentators agree that
military officers are generally obliged—morally, professionally, and legally—to obey civilian orders, even
as they agree that this rule of obedience has exceptions. Commentators tend to differ, however, on the
basis and breadth of these exceptions. Following Samuel Huntington’s classic analysis in The Soldier and the
State, Mr. Robert Atkinson shows that disagreement
about the breadth of the exceptions tends to assume
that their bases—moral, professional, and legal—are
incommensurable. This monograph suggests, to the
contrary, that all defensible exceptions to the rule of
military obedience, like that rule itself, derive from a
single neo-classical, Huntingtonian standard binding
on civilian authorities and military officers alike: the
common good.
This perspective promises significantly to reduce
the range of disagreement over the limits of military
obedience both in theory and in practice.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Several post-September 11, 2001, events—the invasion of Afghanistan and the second invasion of Iraq,
the use of “enhanced interrogation,” the detentions
at Guantanamo, the “air-only” attacks on the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria—have raised a perennially perplexing issue of civilian/military relations: principled
limitations on military officers’ duty to obey civilian
orders. Not surprisingly, contemporary answers have
split along a familiar fault line. Those on one side
emphasize, more or less rigorously, officers’ general
professional duty to obey; those on the other emphasize, more or less expansively, familiar exceptions for
irrational, illegal, or immoral orders.
Paradoxically, both sides find support in the classic statement of modern military professionalism,
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. More
paradoxically, flaws in Huntington’s original analysis
compound the problem, even as the correction of those
flaws offers a common ground. This reexamination
of Huntington’s original position can thus narrow, if
not wholly bridge, the gap between opponents in the
current debate over military obedience.
Part I situates the general obligation of officers
to obey the orders of civilian authorities in Huntington’s basic theory of civilian/military relations. Part
II examines two logical limitations that Huntington’s
theory implies for the duty of military officers to obey
civilian orders: when civilian authorities usurp military officers’ tactical expertise and when civilian authorities lapse in the exercise of their own expertise as
“statesmen.” Part III maps this latter exception onto
the two general exceptions to military obedience, illegal orders and immoral orders, and then ties all
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three exceptions back into the common ground of
military professionalism, the common defense, which
rests on the deeper foundation of both American constitutional law and neo-classical political theory: the
common good.

x

THE LIMITS OF MILITARY OFFICERS’
DUTY TO OBEY CIVILIAN ORDERS:
A NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE1
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to
be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of society; and in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold the public trust.
The Federalist 57 (James Madison)
We the People of the United States, in Order to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
Preamble, Constitution of the
United States
The professional ideology of service goes beyond
serving others’ choices. Rather, it claims devotion to
a transcendent value which infuses its specialization
with a larger and putatively higher goal which may
reach beyond that of those they are supposed to serve.
Eliot Freidson, Professionalism,
The Third Logic: On the Practice of
Knowledge2

INTRODUCTION
Several post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) events—
the invasion of Afghanistan and the second invasion of Iraq, the use of “enhanced interrogation,” the
1

detentions at Guantanamo, the “air-only” attacks on
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—have raised
a perennially perplexing issue of civilian/military
relations: principled limitations on military officers’
duty to obey civilian orders. Not surprisingly, contemporary answers have split along a familiar fault
line.3 Those on one side emphasize, more or less rigorously, officers’ general professional duty to obey;
those on the other side emphasize, more or less expansively, familiar exceptions for irrational, illegal, or
immoral orders.
Paradoxically, both sides find support in the classic statement of modern military professionalism,
Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. More
paradoxically, flaws in Huntington’s original analysis compound the problem, even as the correction
of those flaws offers a common ground. This monograph’s reexamination of Huntington’s original position can thus narrow, if not wholly bridge, the gap between opponents in the current debate over military
obedience.
Part I situates the general obligation of officers
to obey the orders of civilian authorities in Huntington’s basic theory of civilian/military relations. Part
II examines two logical limitations that Huntington’s
theory implies for the duty of military officers to obey
civilian orders: when civilian authorities usurp military officers’ tactical expertise and when civilian authorities lapse in the exercise of their own expertise as
“statesmen.” Part III maps this latter exception onto
the two general exceptions to military obedience, illegal orders and immoral orders, and then ties all
three exceptions back into the common ground of
military professionalism, the common defense, which
rests on the deeper foundation of both American con-
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stitutional law and neo-classical political theory: the
common good.
PART I. HUNTINGTON’S FUNCTIONAL
DERIVATION OF MILITARY DUTY AND
CIVILIAN AUTHORITY
In his 1957 classic, The Soldier and the State, Huntington proposed to solve the classical dilemma of
civilian/military relations: having a military strong
enough to protect the political community without
making that military a threat to the political community. Huntington’s solution was what he called “objective civilian control,” in which “[a] highly professionalized officer corps stands ready to carry out the
wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate
authority within the state.”4 That would give the perfect balance of maximum military preparedness and
minimum risk of military insubordination.5 Military
professionalism, in that arrangement, entails two basic
components, one intellectual and the other moral:6 the
competence needed to defend the homeland, the military’s functional imperative,7 and the virtue necessary
to prevent abuse of that competence at the expense of
civilian values, the military’s societal imperative.8
In Huntington’s first-best, ideal solution to the
problem of military/civilian relations, a professionalized military high command is perfectly matched
to a professionalized upper echelon of civil servants,
whom he calls “statesmen.” The relative scopes of
their respective expertises are the basis for their entire
relationship, with each deferring to the other in their
particular fields:
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The military profession is expert and limited. Its members have special competence within their field and
lack that competence outside their field. The relationship of the profession to the state is based upon this
natural division of labor. The essence of this relationship concerns the relative scope of competence of the
military expert and political expert or statesman.9

As Huntington elaborates on this relationship, two
critical elements become clear. First, each has its proper sphere; second, each must be a proper expert within
its sphere. The military officer, as a professional, is
an expert about one means of achieving state ends,
the management of violence; “it is this area within
which the statesman must accept the judgment of the
military professional.”10
Statesmen, by contrast, use military means toward
state ends. This is their domain, and in this domain
lies their own corresponding competence:
Politics deals with the goals of state policy. Competence in this field consists in having a broad awareness
of the elements and interests entering into a decision
and in possessing the legitimate authority to make
such a decision. Politics is beyond the scope of military
competence. . . .11

Statesmen, in Huntington’s model, are experts
with special competence in the ends of state action;
military officers are experts with special competence
is one particular means of achieving state ends, organized violence. Logically, then, military officers must
be subordinate to statesmen, as means are subordinate
to ends.
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The criteria of military efficiency are limited, concrete,
and relatively objective; the criteria of political wisdom are indefinite, ambiguous, and highly subjective.
Politics is an art, military science is a profession. No
commonly accepted political values exist by which
the military officer can prove to the reasonable man
that his political judgment is preferable to that of the
statesman. The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact.12

Huntington’s ideal of military/civilian relations
distills down to two interlocking syllogisms, both
sharing the same major premise:
•	
Major Premise: The less competent should
defer to the more competent.
— Minor Premise 1: Compared with civilian
leaders, military officers are more competent about the military means of state action.
— Minor Premise 2: Compared with military
officers, civilian leaders are more competent
about the civilian ends of state action.
•	Conclusion 1: Therefore, civilian leaders should
defer to military officers about the military
means of state action.
•	Conclusion 2: Therefore, military officers
should defer to civilian leaders about the
civilian ends of state action.
Huntington’s logic is sound enough; if his premises are true, his conclusions are valid. And, if his conclusions are valid, then the problem of military disobedience disappears. If military officers and civilian
officials are both operating properly in their respective spheres of occupational competence, no conflict
between them arises.
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This, alas, is obviously too good to be true; more
precisely, it is too good to be always true. The real
contribution of Huntington’s analysis lies in its corollaries: what military officers and civilian officials
are to do when ideal conditions are not met. We turn
to those corollaries in Part II. As we shall see, Huntington’s model, properly adjusted, offers principled
limits on the obedience of military officers in two
decidedly second-best scenarios.
PART II: THE LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY
OBEDIENCE IMPLICIT IN HUNTINGTON’S
MODEL
As Huntington’s model identifies separate spheres
of military and political expertise, so it divides the
problem of military obedience into two basic situations: when civilian authorities invade the military’s
proper sphere of expertise and when civilian authorities fail in their own proper sphere. In each case, Huntington’s model implies principled limits on military
obedience. But, in both cases, the full strength of Huntington’s model only becomes clear when important
flaws of that model are sorted out. Part II takes up that
task. In both cases, a better working out of Huntington’s analysis offers a much better understanding of
the limits of military obedience. We begin with the
first situation, where the full implications of Huntington’s analysis only need to be worked out, and
then consider the second, where his analysis needs
significant revision.
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When Civilian Authorities Invade Military Officers’
Proper Sphere.
Recall that, under Huntington’s Conclusion 1, civilian leaders are to defer to military officers in the latter’s area of professional expertise, the use of military
force. Now consider the possibility that civilian authorities do not defer under those circumstances, but
instead usurp tactical control themselves. Huntington
nicely isolates the issue:
What does the military officer do when he is ordered
by a statesman to take a measure which is militarily
absurd when judged by professional standards and
which is strictly within the military realm without any
political implications?13

His answer is unambiguous: “The statesman has
no business deciding, as Adolf Hitler did in the later
phases of World War II, whether battalions in combat should advance or retreat.”14 And he is careful to
make his answer a corollary to his earlier analysis:
The presumption of superior professional competence
. . . does not exist when the statesman enters military
affairs. Here the existence of professional standards
justifies military disobedience.15

But what, one might object, of the military officer’s
constitutional duty, in our very different American
regime, to obey civilian authorities? Does not Huntington’s model, even as it offers a limit to the officer’s
professional duty to obey, create a conflict with the
officer’s constitutional duty to obey? Here Huntington’s model implies an answer that he seems not to
have seen. His justification of disobedience in the case
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of militarily absurd civilian orders is not only professional, but also constitutional. As the Constitution’s
preamble reminds us, a fundamental purpose of our
constitutional regime is “to provide for the common
defense.” That purpose, in turn, implies Huntington’s functional imperative of military professionals:
Provide the intellectual and moral pre-conditions for
competent defense. Assisting in the implementation
of fundamentally flawed tactics could, at least under
some conditions, breach the officer’s constitutional as
well as professional duty.16
Consider, against this background, the situation in
which General Eric Shinseki found himself as Army
Chief of Staff in the Second Gulf War. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz famously challenged Shinseki’s professional estimate about the size of the force
needed to occupy Iraq.17 Had Shinseki come to believe
that he faced civilian orders to implement irresponsible tactics, occupying a hostile country with an inadequate force, he may well have considered himself constitutionally and professionally obliged to resist, even
resign.18 In much the same way, military commanders
might resist, on both professional and constitutional
principles, politically motivated pressure from civilian authorities to put “boots on the ground” without
tactically adequate support or reasonable prospect of
military success in achieving even limited objectives.19
Nor is this potential reconciliation of professional
and constitutional duty the end of the insight that
Huntington’s model offers. Just as the professional
duty reinforces the constitutional duty, so the constitutional duty reinforces an even deeper moral duty.
The constitution’s invocation of common defense assumes a widely shared belief that self-defense is a
basic right, personal and collective, moral as well as
8

legal. The functional limit of an officer’s professional
duty to obey tactically disastrous civilian orders thus
rests on a constitutional duty to defend the constitutional regime, which in turn rests on society’s moral
right of collective self-defense.
Huntington’s analysis also entails, if only implicitly, another significant element: The limitation of the
officer’s duty to obey civilian orders within the area of
military expertise is limited by the foundation upon
which the rule and the exception both rest. To say, as
Huntington does, that an officer is not professionally
required to obey militarily absurd orders is, as he recognizes, to pose an extreme case. It may justify, as in
the case of Hitler’s generals, a response as extreme as
“sabotaging, where possible, impossible policies.”20
But, from that limiting case, we can interpolate both
lesser civilian incursions into the military’s sphere
and less radical responsive measures. Shinseki’s fundamental disagreement over theater-wide tactics did
not lead him to resignation, much less sabotage; a minor disagreement over tactics might lead an officer not
to resign his or her commission, but to remonstrate
with the relevant civilian authorities.21
The point here is not to say that the proper course
of an officer’s conduct in the face of a civilian usurpation of military tactical expertise is always easy to
assess. More often than not, it will entail a complex
assessment of overlapping duties and second-order
effects.22 The point, rather, is that considerations often
seen to be in conflict—professional competence and
constitutional duty—can sometimes be reduced, in
practice as well as in principle, to a common denominator: the common defense and the common good.
Huntington’s theory of professionalism thus
gives a well-grounded exception to the general rule
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of military obedience to civilian orders in the case of
tactically flawed orders, an exception the limits of
which are traceable to the policy underlying the rule.
Against that background, we can now turn to Huntington’s second conclusion: In matters of state ends,
as opposed to military means, officers should defer to
statesmen’s greater expertise.
When Civilian Authorities Fail in Their
Own Proper Sphere.
As we have seen, Huntington’s first conclusion—
that civilian authorities are to defer to the greater expertise of military officers in the latter’s sphere, the
management of violence—has its complement in the
civilian sphere: Officers are to defer to the superior
political expertise of statesman. So, we must now see,
just as the first conclusion implies limits on military
obedience, so does the second.
We need to notice, however, that the two sets of
limits implied by Huntington’s two conclusions are
not perfectly symmetrical. In the case of military expertise, the limitations on the officers’ duty to obey
flow from the civilians’ excursion into the military’s
proper sphere. In the case of civilian expertise, the
limitation on the officers’ duty to obey flows from
the civilians’ failure in their own proper sphere. The
problem in the first situation is that civilian authorities
are not following the logical conclusion of Huntington’s analysis; they are not acting on the mandate to
defer to military officers’ greater expertise in military
matters. The problem in the second situation is that
civilian authorities are not meeting the logical conditions of Huntington’s analysis; they are not providing
expertise in statecraft.
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The trouble with syllogisms, of course, is that their
conclusions are valid only if all of their premises are
true. The problem with the second conclusion of Huntington’s double syllogism is that Minor Premise 2 is
demonstrably false much, if not most, of the time.23
Contrary to Minor Premise 2, military officers are
sometimes better at assessing state ends than are civilian leaders, both because civilian leaders are sometimes poorly versed in matters of statecraft and, conversely, because military officers must be well versed
in precisely those matters.24
Thus Huntington’s second minor premise, the assumption that civilians are always more competent
than military authorities in matters of politics, contains two dubious subpremises, one a universal positive, and the other a universal negative. First, civilian
authorities are always politically competent; second,
military officers are never politically competent. Each
of these subpremises, as we will see in this section,
admits obvious exceptions.
What is more, the premise of statesmen’s superior competence in the political sphere may be false
at either of two different levels of analysis, because
the science of statecraft has two essential components:
achieving state ends and evaluating state ends. With
respect to both of these components of statecraft, civilian leaders are sometimes less competent than their
military counterparts. Part II questions Huntington’s
presupposed superiority of civilian leaders to military
leaders in the political sphere, first in achieving state
ends, and then in evaluating state ends. Both assessments rely primarily on Huntington’s own examples
to show that his assumptions about the relative competence of military officers and civilian leaders are
often demonstrably, even disastrously, false.
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Competence in Achieving State Ends.
Most of the case Huntington makes for the subordination of military to civilian leaders in the political
sphere rests on arguments about statesmen’s greater
competence in achieving, rather than evaluating, state
ends. We begin, accordingly, with the former.
The False Subpremise of Universal Civilian
Competence.
As we have seen, Huntington’s conception of competent statesmanship has two components: “a broad
awareness of the elements and interests entering into a
decision” and “the legitimate authority to make such a
decision.”25 The first thing to notice is that, as a matter
of both fact and logic as well as law, a civilian leader
may have legitimate authority without the requisite
knowledge.
Hitler, again, nicely illustrates the point. Some legally legitimate rulers are, by no reasonable measure,
“statesmen”; they are demonstrably maniacs. Nor is
Hitler a single anomaly here. The last century, Huntington’s century, also gave us Joseph Stalin, Benito
Mussolini, Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, and Idi Amin. All
had, at least at some point, legitimate authority under
international law to make decisions about state ends.
But notice, critically, that none had the other mark
of Huntington’s statesman: “a broad awareness of
the elements and interests entering into a decision.”
Leaving aside, for now, their skill in evaluating state
ends, they were not particularly adept at achieving
those ends.
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To show that some political leaders are not proper
statesmen is only to show that Huntington’s premise
about superior civilian expertise is not universally
true—that it admits notable but perhaps narrowly
limited exceptions. But Huntington does little, if anything, to prove that civilian politicians are proper
professional statesmen more often than not. The closest thing he offers to proof of the proposition’s truth
comes down, in essence, to an argument that it needs
to be true not only as a grounds for his theory’s subordination of military to civilian authorities, but also as
a guarantee of proper civilian government.
In the place of evidence that civilian politicians are
the properly professional statesmen that his theory
needs them to be, Huntington only offers evidence of
when and why that need arose. Here is that evidence,
which Huntington quotes from Field Marshal Earl
Wavell’s The Good Soldier:
Interchangeability between the statesman and the
soldier passed for ever, I fear, in the last [nineteenth]
century. The Germans professionalized the trade of
war; and modern inventions, by increasing its technicalities, have specialized it. It is much the same with
politics, professionalized by democracy. No longer
can one man hope to exercise both callings, though
both are branches of the same craft, the governance of
men and the ordering of human affairs.26

Several factual assertions are confusingly conjoined here; once we tease them out, we find no reason to believe that civilian leaders are invariably, or
even usually, the model statesmen that Huntington’s
model needs them to be.
The first assertion is that, under 19th century conditions, military leadership had to be professionalized
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if it were going to succeed, to meet what Huntington
identifies as its “functional imperative.” We can easily
grant that Huntington has elsewhere proved that first
assertion. The problem lies in the second assertion, that
civilian leadership underwent a similar transformation: “It is much the same with politics, professionalized by democracy.”27 Even if the independent clause
is true, and politics came to require a professionalism
paralleling military professionalism, the modifying
phrase is very dubious evidence. Huntington needs
that phrase to establish two propositions: that democracy somehow made professional statesmanship necessary and that politicians are true professionals.
The first proposition—that democracy made professional politics necessary—is at best unlikely. More
likely, what made professional politics necessary were
the same social factors that made military professionalism necessary: the increasing complexity of the task
at hand, owning to a host of scientific and social factors, of which democracy was only one, and perhaps
not the most critical one. As Huntington’s own citation of Otto von Bismarck implies, political authorities
needed to be statesman even in nations that were far
from being democratic.
The second proposition—that democracy somehow ensures that modern political leaders must be
competent statesmen—is both the more important
and the more dubious, as surprising as it is unexplained. At least since the century of Plato’s Republic
and Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War, the notion of
a class of recognizably professionalized statesmen
has been seen as, if not antithetical to democracy,
then at least in tremendous tension with democracy.
Huntington’s own examples of this new and necessary division of labor only compound the problem.

14

“Napoleon embodied the old unity of military science and politics. He was replaced by Bismarck and
Moltke[,] who symbolized the new dichotomy.”28
Let us assume, with Huntington, that Bismarck was
nothing if not a genius at realpolitik and that his military doppelganger, Helmuth von Moltke, was a worthy Clauwitzian master of war as “politics by other
means.” But Bismarck’s statesmanship, whatever its
merits, is hard to see as either produced or guaranteed by democracy. Bismarck would not likely have
thought to submit his chancellorship to a plebiscite,
and not only because he might well have lost.
The problem with Huntington’s analysis of political professionalism, or statesmanship, comes to this:
Technology- and demography-driven changes in the
19th century may well have made professionalism
functionally necessary in both military command and
civilian administration; this trend toward professionalization, in turn, may well have made it unlikely that
any one person could be a master of both military science and civilian administration. But the emerging
need for professionalism in both fields, military and
civilian, does not prove that need has been met in either field. Nor did the concurrent trend toward political democracy mean that civilian leaders at the highest levels would tend to be, in any sense, professionals
or experts at anything other than getting elected.
This suggests a possibility that, curiously enough,
Huntington failed to mention, if not consider. Although military officers may need both elements of
professional knowledge, Freidson’s marriage of the
technical and the liberal,29 civilian statesmen may
need only one, the liberal, or, if anything more, only
a sort of on-the-job ability to choose professional subordinates.30 A corollary would be that although states-
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men may well lack the qualifications to be officers,
officers might well possess the qualifications to be
statesmen. It cannot have escaped Huntington’s notice, and he cannot have expected it to escape his readers’, that, even as he was publishing his book, Dwight
Eisenhower, the former Supreme Allied Commander,
had just begun his second term as President of the
United States.
That would still mean, of course, that civilian authorities might lack the educational requirements of
statesmanship. Nor, as Huntington’s own examples
remind us, is that the worst of it. Civilian leaders may
not merely lack any policy expertise of their own; they
may eschew reliance on such expertise altogether,
sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, but nonetheless unmistakably. Here again, Hitler is the perfect
paradigm:
Hitler was a mystic, who tended to discount, even
when he did not disregard, all the rules of strategy.
Hitler taught and believed that reason and knowledge
are nothing, and that the unbending will to victory
and the relentless pursuit of the goal are everything.
Mystical speculation replaced considerations of time
and space, and the careful calculation of the strength
of one’s own forces in relation to the enemy’s. All freedom of action was eliminated. Even the highest commanders were subjected to unbearable tutelage.31

Although Hitler is, as usual, the limiting case, his
case is hardly unique. Fascism generally “stress[es]
intuition” and “ha[s] little use or no need for ordered knowledge and practical, empirical realism,”
“celebrat[ing] the triumph of the Will over external
obstacles.”32 Fascism, a sadly hardy perennial among
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political ideologies, illustrates a more general problem: Civilian authorities who rely not on greater
policy expertise but on deeply and manifestly, even
admittedly, irrational modes of decisionmaking.
Of course, even if civilian leaders eschew relying
on expert policy analysis, they may nonetheless be
willing to distort policy analysis in order to bring others, in the military and elsewhere, around to a position
they have reached by their own irrational methods.
This seems to have been significant in Hitler’s overcoming his generals’ objections to his plan to invade
Russia:
Hitler was able to overcome their doubts about his
Russian adventure with the aid of political “information” designed to convince them of its necessity, and
that Russia’s internal weakness would affect her military strength.33

That was most likely not destined to be the last time
that civilian authorities, bent on a military adventure
for reasons unrelated to any rational analysis of the
national interest, overstated both the threat posed by
an enemy and the weakness of that enemy’s internal
support.34 As we shall see in the next section, a military officer corps well versed in geopolitical matters
may provide the best bulwark against such deceptions
and attendant disasters.35
The False Subpremise of Universal Military
Incompetence.
As we have just seen, civilian politicians often
lack or ignore the knowledge base necessary for the
function Huntington’s model assigns them as “statesmen”; now we need to see that, in Huntington’s own
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account, military officers functionally need, and often
actually have, just this knowledge. This is a second
challenge to the minor premise of Huntington’s argument for universal deference of military officers to civilian policy determinations, the notion that military
officers necessarily lack political expertise.
To appreciate this second challenge, we need to
note that Huntington’s version of military professionalism entails two essential parts: tactics, the variable
components of managing violence, and strategy, the
constant components.36 Military officers must master
both tactics and strategy if they are competently to use
military force to achieve state ends.37 Those ends are,
as we have seen, the arena of statesmen’s special competence, politics or policy in Huntington’s model.38 In
trying to distinguish the sphere of the officer from that
of the statesman, Huntington has to make a significant concession: “Obviously a considerable area exists
where strategy and policy overlap.”39
To fulfill their functional imperative, officers must
know not only strategy and tactics, how to use military
means in service of state ends, but also how the use of
military means will affect state ends and be limited by
them. As Huntington insists, “the military man must
recognize that a wide number of conceivably purely
military decisions, such as the selection of a theatre
of war, also involve politics, and he must be guided
accordingly.”40 Think, again, of Hitler’s blunders: Bad
as Bolshevism on the Reich’s eastern border may be,
it would be worse to force Stalin into an alliance with
the western capitalist democracies and open a very
long second front.41 More generally:
The top military leaders of the state inevitably operate in this intermingled world of strategy and policy.
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They must always be alert to the political implications
of their military attitudes. . . .42

As Huntington nicely illustrates, military officers
can, and often do, have access to political expertise of
their own:
When required in his executive capacity to make decisions involving both military and political elements,
the military man ideally should formulate his military
solution first and then alter it as needs be on the advice
of his political advisors.43

In those final phrases, not emphasized in the original,
Huntington seriously undermines his own “division
of labor” argument for military deference to civilian
political expertise. Even if no one person can master
both military “science” and political “art,” a military
officer can refer to political experts within the military. Even assuming, with Huntington, that military
officers cannot be experts on policy, they can, by his
own admission, have political advisors of their own,
presumably on their staff. Acting on the analysis of
these advisors, military officers could plausibly question the policy decisions of civilian leaders and their
civilian advisors.
In fact, Huntington assigns the military two essential functions that entail just such political assessments.
The first of these is what he calls the representative
function. In performing this function, the military officer “must keep the authorities of the state informed
as to what he considers necessary for the minimum
security of the state in the light of the capabilities of
other [military] powers.”44 This function entails:
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the right and the duty to present his views to the public bodies, whether executive or legislative, which are
charged with the apportionment of resources between
the military and other claims.45

The second of these functions is what Huntington
calls “the advisory function.” In performing this function, the military officer is “to analyze and to report on
the implications of alternative courses of state action
from a military point of view.”46
In any of their three capacities—the executory,
the representative, or the advisory—military officers
could find their political analysis at odds with those of
a civilian leader.47 In at least some cases, the military
officers might reasonably conclude that their own political assessments, or those of their political advisors,
are superior to those of their civilian counterparts.
Think only of Wolfowitz’s congressional testimony,
in the face of Shinseki’s troop estimates, that “there
was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, as there was
in Bosnia or Kosovo” and that “Iraqi civilians would
welcome an American-led liberation force.”48
Even more basically, military officers could recognize situations in which civilian leaders are not acting
on political expertise at all, even as Hitler’s generals
recognized with his decision to invade Russia. Even
if it were true, as Huntington insists, that military officers must “be willing to accept the final decision of
the statesman,”49 it doesn't mean they have to follow
the final judgments of political authorities who are
not statesmen; even in the case of those who were, he
would need to give an independent reason for obeying them when their political decisions conflicted with
those of equally reliable political experts, in or out of
the military.
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Huntington’s argument for the general deference
of military to civilian authority on policy decisions assumes a universally superior competence of civilian
authorities to military officers that is, on Huntington’s
own evidence, demonstrably false in many significant
historical cases. What is worse, Huntington gives no
evidence to support his basic premise that civilian authorities are generally more expert in political matters
than their military counterparts and more reliable in
the achievement of state ends, and thus to be deferred
to on that basis. Next, we need to examine an even
worse problem with his argument for general military
deference to civilian authority: the hidden assumption
that civilian authorities are not only better at achieving state ends, but also at choosing or evaluating
state ends.
Competence in Choosing State Ends.
Expertise in using military force and other means to
accomplish state ends is only one aspect of the statesman’s supposedly superior knowledge. The other aspect is evaluating state ends. We have just seen that
Huntington’s argument for military obedience to civilian authority rests on a claim that civilian authority is
always better versed on the relation of military means
and state ends, a claim that is demonstrably false in
many cases, and doubtful in principle across an even
wider range. With respect to evaluating ends, as with
respect to matching means to ends, we have no reason
to believe that civilians will always be right and officers always wrong. Any claim to civilian superiority
in the evaluation of ends shares all the problems with
claims about the matching of military means to civilian ends and compounds them with a deeper problem
long familiar to normative philosophers.
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The special problem of evaluating ends is neatly
captured in Emmanual Kant’s distinction between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives.50
With respect to hypothetical imperatives, the end
entails the necessary means to that end. One may or
may not want the end, but, if one does want it, one
also wants, ex hypothesi, the necessary means. To use
Stalin’s chilling example, if you want an omelet, you
must break some eggs. If your chosen end is an omelet, you will necessarily be breaking some eggs; if
you are a vegan, you will be getting your breakfast
protein from another source.
Stalin, of course, was not really talking about eggs.
Making omelets was his metaphor for his murderous
domestic policies. We remember it because it anticipates, even as it scorns, an obvious objection: Human
beings are not eggs. Even if we cannot quite work out
either the logic or the full implications of Kant’s argument that human beings are ends in themselves, we
can feel the attraction of its negative corollary: Human
beings are never to be used only as means to the ends
of others. To derive from our own rationality an absolute, or categorical, imperative to treat rational nature,
in ourselves and others, always as an end in itself may
be a bit ambitious; that, indeed, is very much the point
we need to see.
No one doubts that we live in a world of hypothetical imperatives, from the preparation of breakfast
to the conduct of diplomacy. It makes perfect sense
to say, as Huntington does, that the accomplishing of
state ends entails special imperatives beyond the ken
of all but the expert: defending the homeland, managing the economy (or leaving it alone), running a legal
system. But, as we have seen, it cannot plausibly be
said, as Huntington does, that civilian authorities are
always better at ends-means rationality than anyone
22

else; sometimes civilian authorities make mistakes
that military officers are quite qualified to spot.
What we need to see here is that it is even less
plausible to say that civilian leaders are always better
than anyone else in choosing what ends to pursue in
the first place. Military leaders, as experts in the management of violence, can sometimes see that civilian
political choices will result not in the ends desired,
but in the very opposite, the destruction of the regime.
Military leaders, as people of ordinary moral sensibility, can see that some ends are deeply disturbing,
even outright unacceptable, for them as individuals
and for any society of which they could agree to be a
functioning part.51
Here again, Nazism proves an important reductio of
Huntington’s analysis. Hitler, he has to admit, proved
a very poor statesman in the actual accomplishment
of state ends; among other things, his political rashness led him to invade Russia prematurely and thus to
open a second front that may well have been his undoing. But consider, now, the alternative. Suppose Hitler had been a savvier grand strategist, had honored
his nonaggression pact with Stalin until he defeated
the Western allies (or developed the V2 or the atomic
bomb or the jet fighter), and had only then turned east
to conquer the Soviet Union, thus securing domination of Europe (and, had he shown similar savvy in
dealing with Japan and the United States, perhaps
the world). Could we, consistent with Huntington’s
analysis, call him a great statesman? If we are to deny
Hitler that accolade, we must be ready to distinguish
between achieving state ends and evaluating those
ends, choosing state ends that are worthy.
Here we see a glaring omission in Huntington’s
analysis of statesmen, particularly in comparison with
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his military officers. Military officers must have not
only special, professional knowledge, but also a special, professional virtue that ensures they do not abuse
that knowledge. Huntington insists that civilian leaders have a corresponding kind of professional knowledge; sometimes, as we have seen, they do not have
that knowledge. Here we see something different. Civilian leaders, like military officers, need a special virtue as well, a virtue that ensures that they do not use
their special expertise in the achieving of state ends to
achieve ends that are bad, in either of two easily identified ways: bad because they threaten to destroy the
civilian population in order to advance regime goals,
as in the case of Hitler’s “Nero orders,” or bad in the
sense that they threaten to destroy the system of international relations, as in the case of Nazi ambitions
of continental, even world, dominance. In tacit recognition of the need for some such limits, Huntington
offers two exceptions to his rule that military officers
always obey the orders of legitimate civilian authorities, exceptions still echoed in today’s debates.
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PART III: TWO EXCEPTIONS TO MILITARY
OBEDIENCE THAT PROVE A MORE BASIC
RULE FOR BOTH MILITARY OFFICERS AND
CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES
Huntington recognizes two exceptions to the military officers’ obligation to obey civilian authorities
in political matters, the proper sphere of civilians:
when those authorities act illegally or immorally.52
Both these exceptions undermine his general rule of
obedience, even as his effort to narrow these exceptions underscores his exaggeration of that rule.53 The
problem in the case of both illegality and immorality
is the same problem we have already identified: Military officers may be better judges in these matters than
their civilian counterparts, because both matters entail
determining the public good. Thus, in effect, what begin as exceptions to the rule of universal military obedience take us back to exactly the same point where
our analysis of that rule took us: Military officers, to
perform their professional duty to defend the homeland, must know and act upon both the constitutional
and the moral bases of that duty, the common good.
The Legality Exception: Officers’ Duty to
Disobey Illegal Civilian Orders.
Huntington admits the first of his exceptions in
the case of conflict between military obedience and
legality. In matters of law, as in matters of both warcraft and statecraft, the question of deference turns on
occupational competence. Thus:
If the statesman claims to be acting legally, but the action seems illegal to the officer, then the issue is one of
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the relative competence of the officer and the statesman to judge what is legal and illegal.54

Since law, strictly speaking, lies outside the expertise of both military officers and civilian statesmen, the
ideal recourse, in modern states with an independent
judiciary, is to the courts.55 In the absence of that option, “the military officer can only study the law applicable to the situation and arrive at his own decision,”
recognizing a duty “to give a considerable presumption of validity to the opinion of the statesman.”56 To
distinguish his refusal to recognize a parallel possibility with respect to military review of civilian policy
decisions, Huntington asserts that “the standards of
law are generally more precise than those of politics
but less than those of military science.”57
Whether or not he is right about the relative precision of the standards of law, politics, and military
science, he is certainly wrong to suggest that “the
military officer can only study the law applicable to
the situation and arrive at his own decision.” In fact,
in law, as in statecraft, military officers, every bit as
much as civilian authorities, are able and likely to rely
on the assessments of their own legal experts. That
was precisely what happened in the now infamous
case of enhanced interrogation. Military officers and
civilian authorities both turned to their legal advisors;
military and civilian lawyers disagreed on whether
“enhanced interrogation” amounted to statutorily forbidden torture. On more precise legal points, as on
broader policy points, the military lawyers may well
have had the better view.58
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Huntington’s focus on these more precise questions of law ignores another parallel between law and
politics, which parallels a distinction we drew within
politics.59 American constitutional law (and, more
generally, any other form of liberal law) imposes two
basic constraints on all state action. It must serve legitimate state ends, and the means it employs must be
rationally related to those legitimate ends. Our actual
legal system, then, like Huntington’s ideal political
system, contains minimum standards for assessing
both the means used to advance state ends and those
ends themselves. Stated at an admittedly rarefied level of generality, these are the standards: The means of
state action must bear at least some plausible causal
relationship to the ends they purport to advance; those
ends must be grounded in the common good and
trammel no more than necessary certain traditionally
recognized conditions of human flourishing.
To illustrate these common floors under both legal and policy analysis, consider again the question
of enhanced interrogation. Even if the civilian lawyers
were correct in concluding that enhanced interrogation was not illegal in the narrow sense that it did not
violate the relevant statutory prohibition on torture,
that still leaves deeper legal questions open. The practice of enhanced interrogation might well have violated constitutional requirements of substantive due
process, in either of two ways. First, it might be that
the use of enhanced interrogation demonstrably does
not work, that enhanced interrogation as a means of
extracting useful information is contrary to any conceivable explanation of human psychology.60 Given
the narrowness of this test and the practical plausibility of enhanced interrogation, the policy may perhaps
pass this first test, even if that policy is, on balance,
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a very poor way of extracting information. It could,
in that sense, be “bad policy” but still “good law,” a
functionally inferior but not wholly ineffectual measure that thus satisfies the minimal constitutional
standard of ends/means rationality.
But that would still leave the other, ends-oriented
constitutional test: Even if enhanced interrogation is
a marginally effective method, is ours a state that can
use human beings, prima facie “ends in themselves,” as
means in this way without violating rights we deem
fundamental? Here, of course, the answer is less clear
as a matter of law. But it is indeed a matter of law—
not merely politics—and legal questions are no more
precise at this level than political questions because
here our politics and law converge. A fundamental
function of our law, like all liberal law, is to limit our
politics (at least provisionally, pending constitutional
amendment).
This returns us to an earlier point: the relative
expertise of military officers and civilian authorities.
On legal matters here, as on political matters earlier
in our analysis, the opinions of military officers and
the experts on their staff may be superior to those of
civilian authorities at every relevant level of analysis.
As others have shown in painful detail, the Justice Department’s “torture memo” was a model of dubious
statutory interpretation.61 More basically, however,
the military’s assessment seems to have been better at
the two levels of ends/means rationality common to
both constitutional law and political statecraft. Torture, as the military argued, may be a poor means of
obtaining operationally useful information; it may
well fail the basic test of ends/means rationality.62 As
a matter of evaluation of state action, torture may fail
as a matter of choice of state ends: We may not want to
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be the kind of people that torture other people (at least
under the conditions no more restricted than those
presented by this situation), and our constitution may
well place that deep preference beyond the reach of
ordinary politics.
The issue of enhanced interrogation also raises a
point that Huntington’s analysis seriously underemphasizes. The law that limits our politics, and thus our
military officers’ duty to obey our politicians, is not
our law alone; the law that governs both our civilian
authorities and our military officers alike is international as well as domestic. Enhanced interrogation
looks, at its uglier extremes, a lot like torture; torture
is forbidden by international treaties as well as by domestic statutes and constitutional norms.63 Torture,
along with a growing list of other human rights violations, may well rest on an even deeper stratum of
international law. It may belong, with genocide and
offensive war, to the class of prohibitions binding on
all state agents, even those whose nations have not
endorsed those norms as their own. Think, again, of
Hitler’s generals.
The case of enhanced interrogation illustrates the
situations in which military officers might have reason to question the legality of particular civilian orders, under both national and international law. To
his credit, Huntington also addresses, if only briefly,
the more basic question about the legality of the civilian authority. Not only are military officers, under
Huntington’s model, obliged to disobey illegal orders;
they are, more generally, obliged only to obey the orders of legitimate regimes. The question of a regime’s
legitimacy is to the question of an order’s legality as
wholesale is to retail. Particular orders of a legitimate
regime may be illegal, and in that sense not binding
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upon officers; no orders of an illegitimate regime may,
of their own force, be binding on officers, because
the regime is not a source of proper law. Without unpacking this latter jurisprudential paradox, we can
note that illegality at the wholesale level, the problem of illegitimate regimes, poses deeper problems
for Huntington’s analysis than he admits, or perhaps
appreciates.
Huntington confuses the question of legitimacy
even as he raises it:
If there are two governments in the state, each claiming to be duly constituted and to be deserving of military obedience, the military officer cannot escape the
political choice between the two.64

This is not quite correct, even in Huntington’s terms.
Some putative governments utterly lack legal authority, under either domestic or international law;
sometimes, as Huntington suggests elsewhere, legal
questions are, indeed, more precise than political
questions. But, here again, at the “wholesale” level as
at the “retail,” questions of legality blur at the margin
into broader political questions.
Here at the wholesale level, we need to note, the
line blurs in a more basic way. As a matter of international law, the legitimacy of a political regime turns,
in large part, on its effective control of the territory it
claims to govern.65 Here, the military must not merely
assess law at its intersection with policy; the military’s policy-based actions may well determine the
legality of the regime it is to serve. Revolutions often
turn on whether the military turns its weapons on the
people in the street or the rulers in the capitol. Marshal Philippe Petain made his peace with Hitler and
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moved his capital to Vichy; General Charles de Gaulle
insisted that his “Free French,” though in exile, were
the legitimate rulers of France. The political choice
that military officers face in this situation, we need to
notice, is theirs as a practical matter, but that is not to
say, as Huntington implies, that it is not capable of
principled review.
Indeed, Huntington’s model implies precisely the
reverse. Military officers’ decisions about the legitimacy of the regime (like their decisions about the legality
of particular orders of an unquestionably legitimate
regime) rest on reviewable principles. Their decisions
also rest on the same principles as the military’s professional role and the state’s proper role—protecting
the basic security of its own people (and, conversely,
not threatening the basic security of other peoples by
actions like offensive war or genocide).
Thus, in effect, Huntington’s analysis places military officers under three imperatives, not just two. In
addition to their professional imperative to deliver effective defense and their legal imperative to preserve
the Constitution, they also have a humanitarian imperative, which underlies both: In the means you use
to defend the state, and in the ends of the state that
you advance, do not violate international restrictions
on the use of violence. As the example of the Nazi officers makes clear, the penalty for violations can be the
severest possible: capital punishment. As the example
of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan also make clear,
the penalty for the regime can effectively be the same:
loss of legal legitimacy under international law and
“regime change.”66
The most basic point to note here is that both international and domestic law, at this deepest level, incorporate humanitarian moral principles. Thus the limit-
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ing case of Huntington’s first exception to his general
rule of military subservience, illegal orders, brings us
to his second exception, immoral orders, which proves
both broader and deeper.
The Morality Exception: Officers’ Duty to Disobey
Immoral Civilian Orders.
Huntington’s second exception to his general rule
of military deference to civilian policy decisions is
“the conflict between military obedience and basic
morality.”67 “What,” he asks, “does the military officer
do if he is ordered by the statesman to commit genocide, to exterminate the people of an occupied territory?”68 One who has not already analyzed Huntington’s peculiar understanding of “statesman” might be
surprised by a question presupposing that statesmen
do order genocide. Even after that analysis, Huntington’s answer is still at least a little surprising. He never
explicitly rules even genocide out entirely; he merely gives officers the option to disobey an order that
violates the officer’s personal morality.
The argument that leads Huntington to this narrow morality exception to his general rule of military
obedience is a page of rousing rhetoric. Only after we
defuse its rhetorical power can we appreciate its logical limits. In what follows, I omit nothing of Huntington’s discussion and quote nothing out of his order; I
merely interrupt it with my own commentary. This is
not, of course, entirely fair to Huntington; all I do here
is to transpose his admittedly stirring rhetoric into a
pitch that is off-puttingly shrill. But Huntington could
hardly cry foul; I am, after all, only returning his sophistical fire with my own, borrowing a page from Aristotle’s Rhetoric on the oldest trick of sophistry: Meet
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the serious with the comic, and the comic with the
serious.69 And, after exposing the rhetoric, I return to
rational analysis, which Huntington can hardly claim
to have attempted in his own treatment of the topic.
Huntington chooses the field of his mock battle and
arrays his forces brilliantly. By charging military officers with a civilian order to commit genocide, he places them on what seems to be very high moral ground,
both relative to civilians and absolutely, ground they
not only can hold, but must:
So far as the ability to judge and apply ethical standards are concerned, the statesman and the soldier are
equal. Both are free individuals morally responsible
for their actions. The soldier cannot surrender to the
civilian his right to make ultimate moral judgments.
He cannot deny himself as a moral individual.70

Both the very humanity of others and the officer’s own
moral integrity—or, perhaps more precisely, manhood—are under attack; the officer, accordingly, cannot surrender.
Suddenly Huntington’s bugle ceases its blare. “Yet
the problem is not so simple as this . . . For politics as
well as basic morality may be involved here.” Not, of
course, the coarse and corrupt politics of politicians,
but the high, and highly principled, politics of statesmen, wise and honorable fellow experts with sacrifices
of their own to make:
The statesman may well feel compelled to violate commonly accepted morality in order to further the political interests of the state. That this is frequently the
case, there is no denying.71
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Just as the professional soldier is about to join
battle on the twin peaks of moral liberty and liberal
humanity, Huntington subtly shifts both the lay of the
land and the alignment of forces. Before, military officers stood, second to none, not only for their own
personal honor, but also for the intended victims of
genocide. Now that apocalyptic beast is nowhere in
sight; its innocent victims, the weak and the helpless,
are no longer in imminent peril.
In the place of evil incarnate and innocence violated appear two abstractions. One, “the political interests of the state,” is not only less loathsome than
genocide but also also the very highest value of the
military profession. And the other abstraction, commonly accepted morality, is a lot less lovable than
the now-vanished victims of genocide. Indeed, the
modifiers of morality remove from its appeal at least
as much as they add. “Common” means “low” and
“frequent” can also mean “universal.” “Accepted” is
far removed from “proved.”
What is more, Huntington reminds his officers
that, in this newly defined battle, they face not an enemy but an ally, the statesman, a fellow servant of the
public good. Huntington asks the loyal soldier to see
the new situation from that ally’s perspective:
If the statesman rejects the private claims of conscience
in favor of the raison d’etat, is he also justified in implicating the military man too, in subordinating, in effect,
the military man’s conscience as well as his own?72

From that perspective, the front of battle is no longer what first it seemed. Orders to commit genocide
fade into the background as Huntington’s argument
advances along a very different line. What the sol-
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dier faces is not the enemy of humanitarian morality,
but the ally who shares his own morality, and an ally
who is ready to sacrifice even his own morality for the
greater good, the public good to which the officer is
pledged. This is not a contest of wills, the soldier’s own
against some other’s; what this situation demands is
not surrender to an enemy, but self-sacrifice to a common cause. The real enemy, it now appears, is a fifth
columnist in the officer’s camp, the source of division
is the soldier’s loyalty, which is an insinuating call
away from public duty to private opinion, if not quite
self-indulgence. “Basic morality,” which had already
slipped to “commonly accepted morality,” now blurs
into “the private claims of conscience.”
For the officer this comes down to a choice between
his own conscience on the one hand, and the good of
the state, plus the professional virtue of obedience, on
the other. As a soldier, he owes obedience; as a man,
he owes disobedience.

The course for the good soldier is, accordingly, clear.
Huntington’s bugle sounds again, and one wonders
that the outcome can ever have been in doubt:
Except in the most extreme instances it is reasonable
to expect that he will adhere to the professional ethic
and obey. Only rarely will the military man be justified in following the dictates of private conscience
against the dual demands of military obedience and
state welfare.73

This is rhetoric to rival Churchill and all the more
reason to notice that Huntington’s conclusion runs, ultimately, rather in the opposite direction. As Churchill
has all English-folk fighting Nazis in the fields and the
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streets, and if necessary in the hills, where they will
never surrender, so Huntington gives his officers the
moral high ground, allows no superior in its defense,
and permits no surrender. But Huntington narrows
his high moral ground to the vanishing point, undermines it completely, and leaves his officers standing
there not only divested of their military status, but
also in full defiance of professionally unquestionable
orders. At the end of Huntington’s analysis, the officer
is no longer fighting the good fight, past the last ditch,
at the last redoubt, to the very end. He is more like
Don Quixote, tilting at illusory windmills, and even
more like an ancient stylitic saint, perched on a pole of
his own erection, naked and alone in a very peculiar,
if not pointless, position.
This is, again, not entirely fair to Huntington; I
have done nothing but grind his high drama down to
low farce. But to score debating points is neither Huntington’s ultimate goal, nor mine. He needs to show
not only that his morality exception is narrow, but also
that it proves his general rule of military obedience to
civilian orders; to do that, he needs to keep that exception as narrow as possible and to ground it in the reason for the general rule itself, the relative occupational
competence of military officers and civilian statesmen.
I need to show that the morality exception is not only
wider than Huntington allows, but also deeply subversive of his general argument for the rule.
To give Huntington his due, we must now do what
he, for whatever reason, declines: Isolate and analyze
the reasoning that underpins his rhetoric. Once we
examine the steps in this analysis closely, bearing in
mind Huntington’s own genocide example, we can see
major problems at several critical points: underweighing moral matters as compared to political matters, all
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the while insisting that the two are commensurable
and that civilian authorities are better at striking the
proper balance. Identifying these problems suggests a
very different weighing of the relevant factors, moral
and political, and a very different conclusion about
whose scales are more reliable, military or civilian.
Huntington’s rhetoric implicitly assigns civilian
authorities and military officers a set of parallel tasks.
The civilians’ tasks logically come first; it is civilians
who, in Huntington’s model, are the ultimate ground
of all military orders, even as they are the source of
his particular example, the order to commit genocide.
•	Step One: Separating moral from political considerations. The civilian authorities must separate moral considerations from political considerations, matters of private conscience from
matters of public welfare, as a logical first step
in assessing one against the other.
•	Step Two: Determining raison d’etat. Here the
civilian authorities, in their official capacity,
weigh up all the nonmoral costs and benefits
of the state action under review. If these net
out negative, they reject the proposal, and the
analysis ends; if raison d’etat net out positive,
they go on to Step Three.
•	Step Three: Measuring morality. Here the civilian authority weighs all the moral costs and
benefits of the proposed action. This step, as
compared to Step Two, has several notable peculiarities. The moral factors and their weighing are, ex hypothesi, outside the scope of the
statesman’s professional competence; what is
more, they seem to be ultimately subjective.
No one else can “check the math” here, because
everyone makes these calculations differently.
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For that reason, the civilian official performs
this step in his or her personal, not official, capacity. If these moral considerations net out to
be positive (or zero), they simply add more (or
nothing) to the balance in favor of the action;
then the civilian official’s analytic work is done,
and he or she goes to Step Five. If, on the other
hand, these moral considerations net out in the
negative, he or she goes on to Step Four.
•	Step Four. Balancing moral costs against state
benefits. Here the civilian authority must weigh
the proposed action’s net moral costs against its
net nonmoral state benefits. This step, like its
predecessor, has several notable peculiarities.
First, the moral costs and nonmoral costs seem
to be, by definition, incommensurable: moral
costs are personal, subjective, and thus unreviewable. Nonmoral benefits are public; they
are interests of the whole state and not of a mere
individual. They are calculated according to expert criteria that, if somewhat subjective, more
art than science, are nonetheless susceptible to
review by other trained professionals (at least
in principle). If the balance here tips in favor of
benefit to the state, the civilian authority orders
the action; if it tips the other way, the civilian
authority must make a personal, private, and
subjective decision about whether to put state
interests ahead of personal morality. A very
heavy thumb is obviously on the state’s side
of the scales, and, given the heavy discount to
be applied to the other side, the balance is not
likely to be tipped that way.
•	Step Five. Issuing the order to the military.
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Military officers who receive an order implicitly
subject it to a parallel, but significantly distinct, analytic process. Their analysis seems to go like this:
•	Step One: Identifying a conflict between moral
duty and professional duty. Military officers
engage in moral analysis of an order only if
they find a prima facie moral objection to the
order.
•	Step Two: Determining raison d’etat. Military
officers do not independently weigh the costs
and benefits of orders they receive from civilian authorities; instead, they take the civilians’
assessments as valid, which is to say, as net
positives.
•	Step Three: Moral analysis. Here military officers, like civilian authorities, weigh up all the
moral costs and benefits of the proposed action. For military officers, as for their civilian
counterparts, this step is personal, not professional, both because moral factors and their
weighing are, ex hypothesi, outside the scope
of their professional competence and because
these matters are ultimately subjective. If these
factors net out positive (or zero), they simply
add more (or nothing) to the balance in favor of
the action; the military officers’ analytic work is
done, and they implement the order. If, on the
other hand, the moral considerations net out
negative, they go on to Step Four.
•	Step Four: Balancing moral costs against state
benefits. Here military officers, like their civilian counterparts, must weigh the action’s net
moral costs against its net nonmoral benefits.
And, here military officers, like their civilian
counterparts, must compare incommensurables: On the one hand, moral costs that are
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personal and subjective, both in value and in
measurement, and rationally unreviewable; on
the other, nonmoral state benefits that are public and objective, both in value and in measurement. But here military officers are at a distinct
disadvantage. Unlike civilian authorities, they
have no particular expertise in assessing nonmoral benefits. Civilian authorities, as professionals, know the proper weight of only one
side of the balance, state benefits; military officers, as professionals, do not know the proper
weight of either side.
	 Here, accordingly, military officers’ best
course is to defer to civilian experts; anything
else entails not only a generally dubious failure
to subordinate incompetence to competence,
but also the particular risk of making a wrong
judgment in the case at hand. What is more,
even a “right” judgment here is doubly dubious: It involves a breach of professional duty,
which entails elevating the personal over the
public. This, we would do well to recall, was
precisely Huntington’s assessment of the generals who politically opposed Hitler. As a result, a proper military professional will defer
except in very rare cases, which will always be
something of a professional embarrassment.
• Step Five: Implementing the order.
We need to look at two aspects of this analytic process particularly closely. One is the relative expertise
of military officers and civilians in weighing moral
and political considerations; the other is the relative
weight of those considerations. First, consider the
question of relative expertise. Notice that Hunting-
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ton’s analysis of military officers’ obedience to immoral orders applies only to orders they receive from
civilians. But, of course, military officers at every level
issue many orders. As Huntington concedes, in issuing those orders, military officials must make appropriate weightings of all relevant factors, political and
moral as well as military. In other words, in the case of
all orders except those coming from civilian authorities, military officers must be following the first set of
analytic steps, those of order issuers, not the second,
those of order implementers. In issuing orders, every
military officer must make precisely the same kind
of assessments that civilian authorities are making in
deciding whether or not to issue an order.
In claiming that military officers are thus at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis civilian authorities, in weighing
moral concerns against state concerns, Huntington is
assuming either of two untenable positions. He might
be assuming that military officers, in deciding whether to issue their own orders, should make no assessment of moral considerations. This hardly seems likely. If they are to make those assessments in deciding
whether to obey orders from others, orders with the
weight of those others’ independent weighing, then
surely they should make that assessment in deciding
what orders to issue. Huntington might, on the other
hand, be assuming that, although they do make such
determinations, they gain no insights or expertise in
this weighing that might tend to put them on a par
with civilians when they are faced with orders coming
from civilians. This, too, seems unlikely, and, in any
case, it is not a prospect that Huntington actually considers. Huntington’s claim for the greater expertise of
civilians in weighing moral against political concerns
seems, at best, unproven and, at worst, at odds with a
more likely account.74
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If Huntington has not made the case for civilian
authorities’ greater expertise in moral and political
matters, he does even worse trying to separate morality from politics and then to subordinate morality to
politics. These latter problems appear as soon as we
put Huntington’s own example of genocide through
his implicit analytic system. Here as elsewhere, the
exception Huntington chooses to admit badly undermines the case he makes, in more abstract terms, for
his general rule. Few see resisting genocide as either
a matter of purely private conscience or an issue only
for the morally squeamish; most, rather, think it must
be part of a larger category of shared moral, even
legal, concern than Huntington’s analysis suggests.
And genocide is only the limiting case on a spectrum
of moral wrongs that, even if not ultimately subject to
mathematical proof, are easily seen to violate widely
shared humanitarian norms. A little this side of genocide is the notion that “life is cheap in the Orient”;
short of killing all the people in a country, one can
make that country an ecological wasteland; maybe a
bit less bad than that, one can “bomb them back to the
Stone Age.”
In opposing these matters, reasonable minds—or,
more precisely, minds that are both reasonable and
humane—can and do tend to agree. This is just a special case of the general rule we have already seen:
Statesmen are not necessarily better judges of state
ends than military officers are. Accordingly, as Martin
L. Cook concludes:
Unwillingness to render obedient service to policies
an officer considers deeply flawed and utterly at variance with sound professional judgment is not necessarily evidence of a lack of professionalism but may on
occasion be a high manifestation of it.75
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Huntington’s effort to reduce the moral weight on
the military officer’s side of the balance to mere individual opinion thus doubly fails. Sometimes military
officers will have very good reason to think their civilian superiors are less competent to judge moral matters, and sometimes, as in the case of genocide, moral
matters may be very weighty indeed. Huntington’s
effort to increase the weight on the civilian side of his
analytic scale fails for precisely parallel reasons. Here,
remember, his move is to stack the civilian side with
weighty matters of state, their particular area of expertise. But, as we have seen already, civilian authorities
may have no such expertise and, even if they do, they
may lack the virtue to use that expertise for the common good. Under either condition, military obedience
to civilian orders will predictably undermine, rather
than advance, the common good. And, for the reasons we have noted, properly trained military officers
are well-positioned to determine whether these two
conditions exist.
Reconciling Rule and Exceptions in Their Joint
Foundation: The Common Good.
The link between Huntington’s illegality and immorality exceptions lies deeper than he means for his
genocide example to suggest.76 Both exceptions take us
back to the minor premise of Huntington’s argument
for the general rule of military obedience to civilian
authority, the assumed superior occupational expertise of civilian authorities over military officers in matters of state welfare. Like the general rule of military
obedience in that domain, the two basic exceptions
to that rule turn on the issue of civilian authority’s
greater expertise.
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In legal matters, as we have seen, statesmen have
no more expertise than military officers, and thus the
latter’s general obligation to defer to the former is, on
matters of law, removed. But, as we have also seen,
this concession tends to prove more than Huntington
intends—that law is not just a parallel discipline entailing different expertise; it is also an independent
constraint on civilian authorities. In moral matters,
Huntington’s argument about relative expertise does
not produce (as he hoped) a much narrower exception than law. As we have seen, it produces a much
broader exception, with the same basis at bottom: the
common good.77
That, in turn, should remind us of what we saw
with respect to the other half of Huntington’s double
syllogism, the duty of civilian authorities to defer to
military officers in military matters. Just as there, in
the sphere of military expertise, officers are sometimes
justified in disobeying civilian authorities who intrude
into an area outside their own expertise, so here, in
the sphere of civilian expertise, military officers are
sometimes justified in disobeying civilian authorities
who lack their own appropriate expertise. Also, here
as there, the military officers’ professional duty and
its legal and moral exceptions can be traced back to,
and resolved in terms of, the same basis as civilian authorities’ corresponding duty and its limit—serving
the common good.
Again, here in the civilian sphere as there in the
military sphere, the limits of the military officers’ justified disobedience to improper civilian orders are to
be measured by the same metric. Just as minor civilian
intrusions in matters of military expertise should be
met with less severe responses than major intrusions,
so minor civilian lapses in legal or moral matters
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should be met with less severe responses than major
lapses. We can thus say, with respect not only to issuing their own orders, but also in deciding whether
and how to obey or disobey civilian orders, military
officers act under a single rule: Do what advances the
common good. And that, of course, is the same rule
under which civilian authorities in a republican form
of government are bound to act.
Finally, this does not mean it will always be easy
for military officers to determine when civilian authorities have failed to follow that rule as it applies
to them. More likely, that determination will never be
easy. Rather, this means the factors military officers are
to consider in both making that determination and in
deciding how to respond to it—the professional, legal,
and moral factors—must all ultimately be reducible to
the common good, the common denominator of both
civilian and military service in any proper republic.
CONCLUSION: NOT A SIMPLE, MODERN
ANSWER, BUT A UNIFIED NEO-CLASSICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Debate over the proper limits of military officers’
obedience to civilian authority often assumes that
three incommensurable sets of values are in play: moral, legal, and professional. As the debate is generally
framed, officers have both a constitutional and a professional obligation to obey civilian orders; sometimes
these duties conflict with each other, and sometimes
either or both also conflict with the officer’s independent moral duties. This monograph has not tried to
solve all conflicts between military officers and civilian authorities but to offer a neo-classical perspective
from which to reframe those conflicts. The focus here,
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following Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, is the
common good that both military officers and civilian
statesmen, as professionals, are supposed to know
and serve.
The preamble to our Constitution reminds us that
ours is a republic—a government devoted to advancing the common good, of which the common defense
and the general welfare are inseparable parts. The
Founders were quite aware that the question of civilian and military relations was a subset of a larger question, finding and maintaining public officials, civilian
and military, both knowledgeable of and devoted to
the common good.
As statesmen, the Founders knew and rejoiced
that they were not the first to try to strike that balance;
they looked back to the English Commonwealth, even
as the leaders of that Commonwealth looked back to
the Roman Republic. As Patrick Henry put it, “Caesar
had his Brutus; Charles I, his Cromwell; and George
III . . . may profit from their example.”78 As John Milton, functioning as Cromwell’s foreign secretary, reminded the crowned heads after English judges had
decapitated their king and abolished the monarchy,
Rome had been a Republic before it became an empire; as the historian Edward Gibbon reminds us, the
values of the Roman Republic were sometimes better
preserved by its military emperors than by its civilian
senators.
The best of those senators, like the best of those
emperors, believed, with our Founders, that the best
government is not that which governs least, but that
in which the wise rule for the common good. Perhaps
Marcus Aurelius—philosopher and ruler, emperor
and general—put it best of all:
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As you are yourself a complement of a social system,
so let every act of yours be complementary of a social
living principle. Every act of yours, therefore, which
is not referred, directly or remotely to the social end
sunders your life, does not allow it to be a unity, and
is a partisan act, like a man in a republic who for his
own part sunders himself from the harmony of his
fellows.79

May all of us, whether our service be civilian or
military, profit from what he practiced as well as
preached.
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